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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Docket No. 920781-CA 
Priority No. 15 
F.M. ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
vs. 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, McNEIL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and AMERICAN CASUALTY OF READING, PA., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From a Summary Judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court, 
in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, Civil Action 
No. 92000052 CV, Honorable Robert W. Daines, Circuit Judge 
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Argument 
The only issue before this Court for review on Appeal is 
whether, as a matter of law, the "pay when paid" provision of the 
subcontract constitutes a condition precedent to final payment, or 
merely a timing mechanism relating to an absolute promise to pay. 
F.M. Electric argues that as a matter of the prevailing law, the 
provision of the subcontract at issue must be interpreted as merely 
a timing mechanism, the failure of which makes payment due within 
a reasonable time. In defense, appellees argue that the provision 
constitutes, as a matter of law, a condition precedent to its 
obligation to make final payment under the subcontract. The 
resolution of these conflicting arguments is no more complicated 
than for this Court to make a legal judgment as to which argument 
must prevail under the undisputed material facts. 
Appellees' reliance on U.C.A. §§15-6-5, and 58-55-16 
demonstrates only Wadsworth's shameful misunderstanding of the 
issue of law presented in this case, as explained at pages 16 
through 18 of Appellant's initial Brief. 
Also as explained in Appellant's initial Brief, Appellees' 
reliance on Zorn v. Sweet. 77 Utah 389, 296 P.2d 242 (1931); 
Johnson v. Geddes. 49 Utah 137, 161 P. 910 (1916). In Zorn. Hood 
v. Gordv Homes. Inc.. 267 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1959), Smith v. 
Bgyden, 49 Idaho 638, 290 P.377 (1959); A.A. Conte v. Campbell-
Lowrie-Lautermilch. 477 N.E.2d 30 (111. App. 1985), Brimmer v. 
Union Oil Co. of Ca., 81 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1936), and Ephraim 
Theater Co. v. Hawk. 321 P.2d 221 (Utah 1958) is in error insomuch 
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as those cases are not truly relevant, and certainly not 
dispositive of the issue presented in the present case in this 
appeal. 
Appellees1 argument that the authorities relied upon by F.M. 
to support its position in this case are inapplicable is simply 
specious and disingenuous and intentionally ignores the only issue 
before the Court on appeal. 
Appellees' argument that F.M. has waived any objection to the 
Affidavits of Mr. Wadsworth is similarly flawed. As discussed in 
F.M.fs initial brief, the Affidavit of Kip Wadsworth relating to 
the intention of the parties is simply parole evidence which should 
not have been considered by the court below. But in any event, the 
Affidavits are simply self-serving statements made after the fact 
of the formation of the subcontract which are neither reliable as 
evidence in light of the language of the subcontract, the best 
evidence of the parties' agreement, nor are the averments of the 
Affidavits in any way dispositive of the issue presented for review 
in this case. 
Finally, Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
provide a remedy or sanction for the payment of attorneys fees and 
costs under the circumstances of this case. There is simply no 
evidence or any other indication that the lawsuit filed and pursued 
by F.M. is frivolous and is otherwise not well grounded in fact or 
law, or brought for the purpose of changing, modifying or, in this 
case, establishing law. The fact that the trial judge found the 
contentions without merit does not make the case frivolous or of 
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the stuff Rule 11 sanctions are made of. Thus, the award of fees 
must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees in this case have sought throughout to avoid the 
central issue presented for determination for the first time this 
Court, or any other Utah Appellate Court. However, there is a 
well-established majority rule which has the force of prevailing 
law, which the Appellant urges this Court to Adopt as the law of 
the State of Utah, and which compels a determination that the 
judgment of the Court below must be reversed. The prevailing, 
majority rule of law regarding the interpretation of "pay when 
paid" clauses in construction subcontracts demands that the clause 
at issue in the present case be interpreted as creating a mere 
timing mechanism for the convenience of the parties, and as 
requiring that final payment be made by Wadsworth/McNeil within a 
reasonable time following satisfactory completion of the 
subcontract work by F.M. Electric. This is particularly true where 
F.M. Electric was not the cause of, nor had any control over, the 
delay in payment from UDOT to Wadsworth/McNeil. It would simply be 
unjust to hold F.M. Electric responsible for payment from UDOT to 
Wadsworth/McNeil. 
Accordingly, F.M. Electric seeks on this appeal (1) a 
determination that the subject provisions do not constitute a 
condition precedent to payment for satisfactorily completed work; 
(2) an order of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the 
court below and ordering that judgment be entered in favor of F.M. 
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Electric and against appellees; and (3) and an order of the Court 
of Appeals requiring appellees to pay all of F.M. Electric's 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this Court and in the court 
below. 
DATED 28th day of May, 1993. 
4 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I, Jeffery R. Price, hereby certify that on this 28th day of 
May, 1993, I caused to be served two (2) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant upon each of counsel for 
defendants by placing same in the United States Mail, first class 
postage pre-paid and correctly addressed to their respective 
mailing addresses as follows: 
Stanford P. Fitts 
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS 
300 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
5 
